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Meiklejohn, Monica, & Mutilation of the
Thinking Process
Clay Calvert*

Fifty years after Alexander Meiklejohn first linked himself to free speech
-jurisprudence with the principle of democratic self-governance,' this Article links
his writings about free speech to the ensuing media coverage of President Clinton's
inappropriate relationship with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky.' It
is a dubious distinction, no doubt, for the famed philosopher and educator 3 to be

* Dr. Calvert is Assistant Professor of Communications & Law and the Co-Director of the
Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment at the Pennsylvania State University. B.A., 1987,
Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coil), 1991, McGeorge School of Law,
University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of
California.
1. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)

[hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH] (articulating a theory of free speech in democratic selfgovernance); see also RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 15 (1992) (observing

that Meiklejohn's 1948 work was "influential" in defining the democratic self-governance theory of free
speech).
2. President Clinton acknowledged in a televised speech on August 17, 1998, that he had "a
relationship with Miss Lewinsky that was not appropriate." Peter Baker & John F. Harris, Clinton
Admits to Lewinsky Relationship, ChallengesStarrto End Personal "Prying," WASH. POST, Aug. 18,
1998, at Al. For background on the upbringing and life of Monica Lewinsky, see Romesh Ratnesar,
The Days of Her Life, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at 36.
3. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN: TEACHER OF FREEDOM (Cynthia Stokes Brown ed.,
1981) (combining a collection of Meiklejohn's educational, philosophical, and legal writings with
biographical information). Meiklejohn "wanted higher education to develop social intelligence in
students," which he defined as "the ability to control one's social environment." MICHAEL R. HARRIS,
FIvE COUNTERREVOLUTIONISTS IN HIGHER EDUCATION 46 (1970). Ultimately, he believed "that the
college, standing apart from its social environment, should develop in its students the intelligence to
become responsible citizens of a democratic society." Id. at 163.

linked with "Oralgate, 4 and one of Bill Clinton's alleged affairs, 5 but the link here
is scholarly, not salacious.
This Article asserts that Meiklejohn's writings on the values of free speech in
a self-governing democracy provide an excellent philosophic context 6 and an ideal
lens through which to consider and evaluate press coverage of the latest
"Washington sex-and-deception scandal."7 That coverage, of course, has caused
much consternation and self-reflection-or perhaps pseudo self-reflection-among
journalists.8 Meiklejohn prized self-reflection. He once praised the United States
and Britain for having developed what he called "the high political art of selfcriticism."9 Today, Meiklejohn's own writings help to providejournalists and legal
scholars alike with the necessary structure and guideposts for that same "art of selfcriticism." '0
In particular, Meiklejohn's work provides a serious, alternative framework to
the pointless pontification and verbal masturbation of the Washington pundits who
critique the media's performance while simultaneously stroking their own egos on
frenetic talk shows such as CNN's Crossfire." More importantly, his writings are
laden with statements and admonitions which raise many important questions that
should frame debate about whether the press did its job properly when it "saturated
the airwaves and print media"' 2 with ratings grabbing coverage 3 about President

4. See Frank Rich, The Joy of Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1998, at A23. In addition to "Oralgate,"
the events have been dubbed "Zippergate" and "Clinterngate." See Rebecca Eisenberg, It's the Sex,
Stupid, S.F. EXAMINER, Feb. 8, 1998, at B5; Michael Kinsley, In Defense of Matt Drudge,TIME, Feb.
2, 1998, at 41.
5. Lewinsky is alleged to have had "sexual liaisons with President Clinton." See William Booth
& William Claiborne, Lewinsky Seeks a "Normal" Life, WASH. POST, Feb. 4, 1998, at A12.
6. Although modem legal scholars tend to think of Meiklejohn only for his writings on free speech,
it must be remembered that, by education and training, Meiklejohn was first and foremost a philosopher
and educator. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN: TEACHER OF FREEDOM, supranote 3, at 4-9 (describing
Meiklejohn's studies of philosophy at Brown University and Cornell University and his work as an
instructor of philosophy at Brown University). Meiklejohn served as dean at Brown University and
later as president of Amherst College. See id. at 8-19.
7. See David M. Shribman, Americans Will Take Policy Over Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 17,
1998, at Al.
8. See Sherry Ricchiardi, Standardsare the First Casualty, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Mar. 1998,
at 30, 30-31 (describing a "journalistic standards meltdown" in reporting on the Lewinsky incident).
9. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN: TEACHER OF FREEDOM, supra note 3, at 138.
10. See id.
11.See CNN Crossfire: Are Reporters in Feeding Frenzy Over White House Controversy(CNN
television broadcast, Feb. 9, 1998) (discussing the media's coverage of the Lewinsky scandal).
12. Times Washington Bureau NationalPerspective; Washington Insight, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 11,
1998, at A5.
13. See Richard E. Berke, Clinton's O.K. in the Polls, Right?, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1998, at Week
in Review 1, 5. Traffic on Internet news sites, as well as newspaper and magazines sales, rose
"markedly" after the Lewinsky story broke. See id. More people watched the NBC Sunday morning
news show Meet the Press on the Sunday after the scandal broke than since the height of the 1991
Persian Gulf War. See id.; see also CNN Reliable Sources: The DangerousBacklash Against the
Media (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 14, 1998) ("Coverage of this story has been a ratings bonanza.
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Clinton's alleged sexual relationship with Monica Lewinsky.14 The relevance of
Meiklejohn's work extends well beyond the narrow reaches of the ClintonLewinsky entanglement, of course, and includes general press coverage of politics
during the age of tabloid television and the cyber journalism of Matt Drudge.
This Article does not pretend, however, to resolve the issues it raises from a
Meiklejohnian perspective regarding the press coverage of the Lewinsky scandal.

Indeed, given Meiklejohn's penchant for the open-but-orderly process of debate
at a town hall meeting, 5 it would be inappropriate for one individual to resolve any
issue alone. This Article does, however, use Meiklejohn's principles and theories
to raise important questions concerning the recent press coverage. This inquiry is
well grounded in a body of work associated, at least since the United States
Supreme Court's seminal defamation decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,16
with First Amendment 7 jurisprudence that is fundamental to both a free press and
a democracy at the close of the twentieth century. Furthermore, this Article teases
out different perspectives and suggests possible responses and answers to these
questions.

Particularly for cable shows, viewership is up.").
14. Stories about the matter often have been salacious, appealing to prurient interests of the
audience. See Adam Cohen, The Press and the Dress, TIME, Feb. 16, 1998, at 52 (describing the
anatomy and chronology of the so-called "sex dress" story involving the allegation that Monica
Lewinsky kept a dress allegedly stained with President Clinton's semen).
15.

See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE

PEOPLE 24 (1960) [hereinafter MEIKLFJOHN, POLmCAL FREEDOM] (Meiklejohn described the
traditional American town meeting "as a model by which free political procedures may be measured.
It is self-government in its simplest, most obvious form.").
16. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). "Sullivan is often understood to reflect the conception of freedom of
expression advocated by Alexander Meiklejohn-a conception of self-government, connected to the
American principle of sovereignty." CASSR. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIALCONSTITUTION 206 (1993). See
LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 49 (1986) (observing what he calls an axiomatic
"Meiklejohn-Sullivan alliance"). The source of this link often is attributed to a 1964 law journal article
about Sullivan that made specific reference to Meiklejohn. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times
Case: A Note on the "CentralMeaning ofthe FirstAmendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REV. 191,209 (1964)
(stating that the Sullivan opinion "almost literally incorporated Alexander Meiklejohn's thesis that in
a democracy the citizen as ruler is our most important public official"). Bollinger argues that Kalven's
article confirmed the association between the Supreme Court's reasoning in Sullivan and the philosophy
of Meiklejohn. See BOLLINGER, supra, at 49. Today, it is a "relatively uncontroversial working
hypothesis that the [Sullivan] decision rested on Professor Meiklejohn's conception of the First
Amendment." See Cass R. Sunstein, HardDefamation Cases, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 891, 898
(1984).
17. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that "Congress
shall make no law.., abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....
" See U.S. CONST. amend.
1. The Free Speech and Free Press Clauses are applied to states and local governments via the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Gitlow v. New York, 268
U.S. 652, 666 (1925).

Part I provides a brief primer on Meiklejohn's theory of free expression."
Drawing directly on specific passages from Meiklejohn's writings, Part I raises
five questions that help to frame debate and discussion about press coverage of the
alleged sexual liaison between Lewinsky and the President.' 9 Furthermore, this
part of the article explains why these particular questions are so relevant. Part III
sets forth alternative responses and options to the issues raised in Part 11.20
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL SPEECH IN A SELF-GOVERNING
DEMOCRACY
The principle of free speech, Meiklejohn wrote, "springs from the necessities
of the program of self-government. ' , 21 Speech that serves a self-governing
democracy is speech that facilitates the "voting of wise decisions" 2 and deals with
"the general welfare."23 Therefore, such speech must receive the utmost First
Amendment protection. 24 As Meiklejohn wrote, "[p]ublic discussions of public
issues, together with the spreading of information and opinion bearing on those
issues, must have a freedom unabridged by our agents. '25 The quality of that
public discussion and debate, in turn, "is measured by its capacity to facilitate
[wise] public decision-making."26
A. When Speech May Be Abridged
Although Meiklejohn privileges political speech that is "upon matters of the
public interest, '27 some political speech may be abridged to facilitate an orderly,
productive debate. Meiklejohn once remarked that the First Amendment "is not
the guardian of unregulated talkativeness"" and that public discussion must not

18. See infra notes 21-61 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 62-123 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 124-146 and accompanying text.
21. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supranote 15, at 27. For Meiklejohn, self-government
is one in which "[r]ulers and ruled are the same individuals." See id. at 12. It entails a basic agreement
or compact "that all matters of public policy shall be decided by corporate action, that such decisions
shall be equally binding on all citizens .... See id. at 14.
22. See id. at 26.
23. See id. at 87.
24. See id. at 84. Meiklejohn supported "[tihe principle of the unqualified freedom of public
speech." See id.
25. Alexander Meiklejohn, The FirstAmendment is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 257.
26.

See ROBERT C. POST, CONSTrrUTIONAL DoMAiNs: DEMOCRACY, COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT

271 (1995).
27. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 24.
28. See id. at 26.
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become "a dialectical free-for-all. "29 The manner of presentation of political
speech is important. As he wrote, "facts and interests must be given in such a way
that all the alternative lines of action can be wisely measured in relation to one
another. 30 Some speech about politics may, then, be regulated. Thus, "[w]hat is
essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be
31

said.",

Meiklejohn illustrated this point by offering up "the traditional American town
meeting" as "a model by which free political procedures may be measured. 3 2 The
town meeting requires that "certain rules of order will be observed."33 What speech35
34
is out of order? Speech that is redundant, that "wanders.from the point at issue,"
that is interruptive,36 that mutilates the thinking process of the community.3 7 The
debate, in other words, must be reflective and deliberative, following certain
procedures that facilitate these ends.38 It must be structured.39 Speech may also be
abridged when it is unrelated to the governing of the nation. Meiklejohn wrote that

29. See id. at 25. The outbreaks and chanting at the "town meeting" at Ohio State University in
February, 1998, in which United States foreign-policy officials tried to explain and defend United States
policy in Iraq, represent the kind of dialectical free-for-all that Meiklejohn wanted to prevent. See
Bruce W. Nelan, Selling the War Badly, TIME, Mar. 2, 1998, at 26, 27. Although Meiklejohn surely
would allow the dissenters' views to be heard, he also surely would have objected to the out-of-order
raucous that threatened to transform the meeting into communicative chaos.
30. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLMCAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 26.

31. See id. (emphasis added).
32. See id. at 24. Today, town meetings are anachronisms "surviving only in a few eccentric
backwaters ofYe Olde New England." Andrew Ferguson, Ye Olde Town Gimmick, TIME, Mar. 2, 1998,
at 88.
33. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 24.
34. See id. at 26. Meiklejohn wrote:
If, for example, at a town meeting twenty like-minded citizens have become a "party," and if
one of them has read to the meeting an argument which they have all approved, it would be
ludicrously out of order for each of the others to insist on reading it again. No competent
moderator would tolerate that wasting of the time available for free discussion.

Id.
35.

See id. at 24-25. As Meiklejohn observed "all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall

be fully and fairly presented to the meeting," thus speech that is irrelevant to the public issue would be
out of order and not protected. See id. at 26 (emphasis added).
36. See id. at 25. "If one man 'has the floor,' no one else may interrupt him except as provided by
the rules." Id. at 24.
37. See id. at 27. "It is that mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the
First Amendment to the Constitution is directed." Id. at 27 (emphasis omitted).
38. See Cass R. Sunstein, The FirstAmendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALEL.J. 1757, 1762 (1995)
(stating that Meiklejohn's views on the United States' constitutional system emphasize "deliberative
democracy" in which there is "reflective and deliberative debate about possible courses of action").
39. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION 247 (1991) (noting that
Meiklejohn depended on structure).

the First Amendment does not protect "private interests." 4 For instance, he
observed that the First Amendment gives no protection to the defendant in the
private defamation action.4' In addition, "[w]ords which incite men to crime are
themselves criminal and must be dealt with as such., 42 Meiklejohn acknowledged
that in these cases "decisive repressive action by the government is imperative for
43
the sake of the general welfare. ,
Meiklejohn also suggested that speakers who are "not engaged in the task of
enlarging and enriching human communication," 44 but who instead are "engaged
in making money," 45 do not always receive full First Amendment protection.
Private profit is not the goal of free speech. Meiklejohn wrote: "[T]he First
Amendment does not intend to guarantee [individuals the] freedom to say what
some private interest pays them to say for its own advantage. It intends only to
make [individuals] free to say what, as citizens, they think, what they believe,
46
about the general welfare. ,
Private media enterprises thus must do more than serve a purely private profitmaking function for owners and shareholders. Meiklejohn suggested that they
must "cultiv[ate] those qualities of taste, of reasoned judgment, of integrity, of
loyalty, of mutual understanding upon which the enterprise of self-government
depends. 47 Unfortunately, many media enterprises "have used [the First
Amendment] for the protection of private, possessive interests with which it has
48
no concern."
Finally, Meiklejohn suggested that individuals and entities must exercise selfcontrol in the use of free speech. "Political freedom does not mean freedom from
control. It means self-control. 49 In turn, "we must exercise control over our
separate members. 5 ° We must cooperate with each other and engage in
"responsible" discussion.5
B. When Speech May Not Be Abridged
Speech may not be prohibited because it is thought to be false, dangerous,
unwise, unfair, un-American, or disagreeable. 2 As Meiklejohn wrote, citizens

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supranote 15, at 57.

See Meiklejohn, supra note 25, at259.
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 21.
See id.
See id. at 87.
See id.
See id. (emphasis added).
See id. at 87.
See id.
Id.at13.
See id.
at16.
See id.
at25.
See id.
at27.
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"may not be barred [from speaking] because their views are believed to be false or
dangerous. No plan of action shall be
outlawed because someone in control thinks
53
it unwise, unfair, or un-American.
Likewise, verbal attacks made to show the unfitness of a candidate for
governmental office should not be subjected to legislative control.54 Instead, as
Meiklejohn wrote, "all facts and interests relevant to the problem shall be fully and
fairly presented to the [town hall] meeting., 55 All information that can make voters
"as wise as possible"5 6 must be permitted. Thus, Congress may create legislation
designed to "enlarge and enrich" free speech on public issues and.to facilitate "the
unhindered flow of accurate information," so long as such legislation does not take
away from the presentation of diverse perspectives.5 7 Congress, as Meiklejohn put
it, is "not forbidden to engage in that positive enterprise of cultivating the general
intelligence upon which the success of self-government so obviously depends."58

C. Overview: Substantive and ProceduralAspects of Meiklejohn 's Theory
Meiklejohn's theory of. free speech is both substantive and procedural.
Substantively, speech that affects the general welfare, described as speech "upon
matters of public interest, 59 must be given heightened constitutional protection
compared to speech concerning private issues that does not affect self-governance
or public policy issues. Procedurally,however, political speech must occur in an
ordered fashion that brings maximum benefit to the audience and the potential
voters, not the speakers. Speakers' rights thus may be abridged, Meiklejohn wrote,
because "the point of ultimate interest is not the words of the speakers but the
minds of the hearers."60 Phrased differently, the autonomy of speakers may be
6
sacrificed at the altar of service for a collective need for wise decision making. '

53. See id. (emphasis added).
54. See Meiklejohn, supranote 25, at 259.
55.

MEIKLEJOHN, POLICAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 26.

56. See id.
57. See id. at 19. "Congress is not debarred from all action upon freedom of speech. Legislation
which abridges that freedom is forbidden, but not legislation to enlarge and enrich it." Id.
58. See id. at 19-20 (emphasis added).
59. See id. at 24.
60. See id. at 26.
61. See POST, supra note 26, at 276 (providing that Meiklejohn's theory "postulates a specific
objective' for public discourse, and it concludes that public debate should be regulated instrumentally
to achieve this objective" and that this objective may lead to the censorship of "speakers whose
expression is deemed incompatible with the achievement of a rich and informative public dialogue").

II. FRAMING DEBATE ABOUT COVERAGE OF THE LEWINSKY SCANDAL
Meiklejohn's writings suggest at least five questions that frame the debate
concerning press coverage of the allegations that President Clinton had an
"inappropriate physical relationship" with a White House intern. This quintet, in
turn, raises a number of sub-issues that are also useful in analyzing and critiquing
press coverage of these allegations.
It must be emphasized that these five questions focus narrowly on press
coverage of the alleged sexual liaison itself, not coverage of whether President
Clinton suborned perjury of Ms. Lewinsky. Why?
It is the reportage of President Clinton's sexual life that has attracted the most
public criticism, with sixty percent of U.S. adults surveyed in January, 1998,
believing that Americans should not be informed about the private lives of
Presidents, including any extramarital affairs, 62 and another seventy-five percent
telling pollsters that there is too much coverage of the scandal.63 Journalism
professor Mark Popovich observed that " [q]uestions of how to deal ethically with
invasions of privacy, marital infidelity, and sexual escapades in the political arena
have taken on as much importance as how to cover candidate platforms, party
strategy and campaign events. ' The subject matter of the five questions posed
here focuses broadly across the legal, ethical, and political landscape.
Furthermore, as the editors of the Columbia JournalismReview opined, in light of
the press coverage of the Lewinsky incident, there has never been "a better time to
start examining what journalists can do, immediately, to improve and recapture
public respect." 65 It is the press that ultimately "stands to lose in the court of public
66
opinion" from "this lamentable and depressing affair.
A. The Questions
The questions set forth here draw directly from the language of Meiklejohn's
writings. Each, as described later, raises a series of sub-issues that also pertain to
Meiklejohn's writings. The five pertinent questions are as follows:
1. Is speech about the sex life, oral or otherwise, of the President of the United

62. See The People's Court, TIME, Feb. 2, 1998, at 32, 33.
63. See Rich, supranote 4, at A23; see also James Bennet & Janet Elder, Despite Intern, President
Stays in Good Graces, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 1998, at Al (stating that three-quarters of Americans
polled by The New York Times/CBS News believe the press has spent too much time on President
Clinton's sexual relationship with Lewinsky). In contrast to coverage of the alleged sexual affair, more
than 60 percent of individuals polled by The New York Times/CBS News feel it is important to know
whether President Clinton asked Lewinsky to lie under oath. See id.
64. Mark Popovich, The Press, Privacy and Politicians,in CONTEMPORARY MEDIA ISSUES 156,
156-57 (William David Sloan & Emily Erickson Hoff eds., 1998).
65. See What We Do Now, COLUM. JOuRNALIsM REv., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 25.
66. See id.
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States speech "upon matters of the public interest '67 or speech that affects the
"general welfare" ?68
2. Does press coverage of the sex life of the President of the United States
contribute to the "mutilation of the thinking process of the community against
which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed"69 or is it part "of
cultivating the general intelligence"?7"
3. Are journalists akin to moderators at a town meeting who should reduce
their own coverage of the sex scandal if it becomes repetitious and "wast[es] ...
the time available for free discussion"? 7'
4. Is broadcast journalism, as illustrated by coverage of the Lewinsky matter,
becoming a "dialectical free-for-all 7 2 in which promotion of democratic selfgovernance is taking a backseat to the promotion "of private, possessive
interests, 7 3 namely, the financial well-being of the owners and operators of media
outlets?
debate
5. Does repetitious coverage of the alleged Lewinsky affair "enlarge" 74
about public issues while, conversely, not serving to "enrich" that debate?
B. Why the Questions are Important
This section describes the relevance and importance of the questions set forth
above. It addresses each question separately. In the process, it identifies subissues or mini-questions to which each of the five major questions direct attention.
1. Question No. 1
The threshold question is perhaps the most important of the quintet: Is speech
about the sex life, oral or otherwise, of the President of the United States speech
"upon matters of the public interest "71 or speech that affects the "general
welfare" ?76
This question raises the issue of whether the allegations of the President's

67. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supranote 15, at 24.

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See
See

id. at 87.
id. at 27.
id. at 20.
id. at 26.
id. at 25.
id.
at 87.
id. at 19 (providing that Congress may legislate to "enlarge and enrich" speech).
id. at 24.
id. at 87.

extramarital sexual conduct is political speech. The question, in turn, suggests a
speech debate that divides speech into categories of political expression, speech
that affects the general welfare and promotes wise and informed decision making,
as Meiklejohn would put it,77 and private speech. It must be remembered that
Meiklejohn's theory of free speech is hierarchical in nature, placing political
speech at the top of a hierarchy of free speech values, while speech that serves
78
private interests or is irrelevant to the general welfare receives a lesser protection.
The question also suggests a parallel dichotomy to the political/private
expression debate. This dichotomy is based on Meiklejohn's concern with
protecting speech "upon matters of the public interest. '7 9 This second dichotomy
thus focuses on the meaning of the phrase public interest. Is the public interest
what the public merely is interested in-individual-levelwants andpreferences-or
is the public interest something that serves the collective-level needs of society as
80
a whole?
It appears that many members of the public were clearly interested in the
subject matter of the Lewinsky allegations, considering Americans "devoured
every tidbit available about sluttiness, sleaze and public slime."' 81 As Joshua
Quittner of Time magazine observed, "I don't care what the polls say about how
everybody thinks the media overcovered Monica. As one of the guys who runs
Time Daily's Web site, I know better: You wanted as much of her as we had to
give. And then some." 82 To summarize, the public wanted the information, but did
they need it?
The threshold question evoked by Meiklejohn's writings thus raises two
dichotomies, politicalspeech versus private speech, and individual wants versus
public needs, that nicely frame discussions about both the nature of the speech at
issue in the Lewinsky sex-allegation scenario and journalists' responsibilities in
reporting about it. If the speech is political or serves public needs, Meiklejohn's
work sets forth sound reasons for its distribution and dissemination. If, on the

77. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
79. See MEIKLEOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 24.
80. As communications professor George Gladney asked, "should newspapers give readers what
they need to make intelligent decisions in a participatory democracy, or should they give readers what
they want, even if it means forgetting public policy decisions?" George Albert Gladney, Giving
Readers What They Want orNeed?, in CONTEMPORARY MEDIA ISSUES 291,292 (William David Sloan
& Emily Erickson Hoff eds., 1998). Ideally, "[n]ews media should tell people what they need to know
because [the] media ha[s] the power to affect the lives of individuals and groups within society." See
Deni Elliott, Foundationsfor News Media Responsibility, in RESPONSIBLE JOURNALISM 32, 35 (Deni
Elliott ed., 1986) (emphasis added). See generally Christopher Meyers, Justifying JournalisticHarms:
Right to Know vs. Interest in Knowing, 8 J. MASS MEDIA ETHICS 133 (1993) (describing a similar
dichotomy between the public's right to know and the public's interest in knowing).
81. See Reese Cleghom, The News: It May Never Be the Same, AM. JOURNALISM REv., Mar. 1998,
at 4.
82. See Ricchiardi, supra note 8, at 32.
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other hand, one judges the allegations about President Clinton's sexual life to fall
on the private side of the metaphorical border separating political from private
speech, then Meiklejohn's work does not support publication.
The press, as the dispute over the coverage of the Lewinsky incident amply
illustrates, polices the metaphorical border between the public and private realms.
Its coverage tests the social constructions of private speech and political speech,
suggesting the temporal and amorphous qualities of these terms. Meiklejohn's
work, in turn, forces us to confront these issues, concepts, and constructions
through both a philosophical and First Amendment framework.
2. Question No. 2
Meiklejohn's writings suggest a second question that encourages further
thinking about issues raised by the first question. The second question is: Does
press coverage of the sex life of the President of the United States contribute to the
"mutilation of the thinking process of the community against which the First
Amendment to the Constitutionis directed"83 or is it part "of cultivating the general
intelligence"'#'
This question is pivotal because it suggests another dichotomy that frames
debate, a dichotomy that differentiates between press coverage that cultivates or
mutilatesindividual thought concerning politics. Both of Meiklejohn's statements
that are captured in this question involve how the public thinks about politics, one
focusing directly on "the thinking process"85 involved in our political decisionmaking process and the other centering on our "general intelligence"' 86 about
politics.
This dichotomy, in turn, forces consideration of whether unfettered press
coverage of the President's sex life detracts from the manner in which the public
thinks about and processes politics. Do stories "about oral sex and presidential
semen ' 87 really promote intelligence and clear thought about modem political
matters? More specifically, do these stories promote intelligence and clear
thinking when they rest 88only on the slenderest reeds of evidence-unidentified,
uncorroborated sources?

83.

See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 27.

84. See id. at 20.
85. See id. at 27
86. See id. at 20.
87. See Cleghorn, supra note 81, at 4.
88. See Ricchiardi, supra note 8, at 32 (observing that the story about Lewinsky's allegedly semenstained dress was often times attributed "to unnamed sources" and that Newsweek magazine, the
publication that broke the story, refused to identify the source).

Meiklejohn's discussion of a "thinking process" 9 also suggests that the
manner of press coverage should be deliberate. It should be such that actual
thinking, not pseudo-reflection or purely emotional responses, may occur; thinking,
in other words, that is not rushed or hurried by a scoop mentality. 90 In the
Lewinsky incident, there was a "rush to publish" 91 stories that often appeared
"pegged more on salacious rumors than solid news gathering 92 and that may have
ultimately mutilated the thinking process of both journalists and the public
concerning truth and falsehoods in politics. 93 Does cultivation of the general
intelligence94 require more deliberate, better-sourced reporting? Meiklejohn's
work, as parsed in Question No. 2, provides a framework for analyzing these
knotty issues.
3. Question No. 3
The third question is: Are journalists akin to moderators at a town meeting
who should reduce their own coverage of the sex scandal if it becomes repetitious
and "wast[es] .. .the time available for free discussion"? 95 This question is
important for a number of reasons.
First and foremost, it forces consideration of the role the press plays, or,
perhaps, should play, in facilitating debate or discussion about issues such as the
Lewinsky scandal. Is the press really responsible for organizing and presenting
information in a particular manner that cultivates the kind of wise decision making
that Meiklejohn viewed as the ultimate goal of free speech? Is the press truly a
moderator of that discussion or merely an information provider? Is the news
media, in their many forms-print, broadcast, cable, Internet-, providing a modernday kind of metaphorical town hall meeting?
The question is important for a second reason. It calls attention to issues of
self-restraint and self-control on the part ofjournalists in covering sensational news
stories like the Lewinsky incident. Meiklejohn admonished that "[p]olitical
freedom does not mean freedom from control. It means self-control. ', 96 Is it better
then for journalists, as compared to the government, to perhaps play the role of
moderator of their own coverage? Surely most people would answer this question

89. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 27.
90.

See generallyNORMAN E. ISAACS, UNTENDED GATES: THE MISMANAGED PRESS 44-62 (1986)

(providing background on the scoop mentality that often guides the behavior of journalists).
91. See Ricchiardi, supra note 8, at 33.
92. See id.
93. "The rush to be first or to be more sensational created a picture of irresponsibility seldom seen
in the reporting of presidential affairs." Jules Witcover, Where We Went Wrong, COLUM. JOURNALISM
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1998, at 18-19.
94. See MEKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 20.
95. See id. at 26.
96. See id. at 13.
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in the affirmative, fearing government control over the press more than the press'
unfettered control over itself. Yet at the same time, the public clamors for some
kind of restraint on press coverage when it comes to issues about the sex lives of
individuals, including the President. 97
For instance, a WashingtonPostpoll taken ten days after the Lewinsky story
broke found that seventy-four percent of those surveyed thought that the press was
giving "too much attention" to the story. 98 A Pew Research Center poll of 844
people taken from January 30 through February 2, 1998, found that fifty-four
percent of those surveyed thought the press did only a "fair or poor performance
in providing the right amount of coverage" of President Clinton's sex life.99
An issue of quantity, not just quality, of reporting thus springs from Question
No. 3. At what point does speech about an issue, such as the Lewinsky scandal,
become, as Meiklejohn might have put it, redundant, repetitious, and that "wast[es]
the time available for free discussion"? 1°° At what point does the press beat a story
into the ground so that its coverage no longer channels new, useful information
into the public decision-making process? Is there really a quantifiable threshold
at which coverage suddenly becomes out of order?
Question No. 3 also highlights a tension between the profit interests of media
organizations and the public interests of self-governance. News media coverage
that Meiklejohn may consider repetitious and that "wast[es] the time available for
free discussion,"' on issues such as the alleged Lewinsky affair, may nonetheless
be very profitable for the networks. Indeed, despite the networks' protestations
that there was too much coverage, the fact remains that "[v]iewing and listening
audiences swelled, as did newspaper and magazine circulation, accommodated by
special press runs."10 2 In other words, a story such as that about Lewinsky may be
exceedingly profitable in terms of press coverage and yet, at the same time, the
repetitious and redundant coverage of that story may not serve democratic self03
governance. 1
In turn, this tension raises a further concern. Does the media attempt to turn
an issue that many Americans apparently feel is a private matter into a political one

97.
98.
99.
100.

See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
See Witcover, supranote 93, at 19.
See What We Do Now, supra note 65, at 25.
See MEIKLEJOHN, POLMCAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 26.

101. See id. at 23.
102. See Witcover, supra note 93, at 19.
103. Meiklejohn believed that redundant speech could be restricted.
accompanying text.

See supra note 34 and

in order to justify and maintain profitable coverage?""4 Some journalists might
argue that the story is political speech as Meiklejohn would define it, not because
they really believe it is political in nature, but instead to provide a legitimate cover,
excuse, or mask for otherwise sensationalistic and salacious information about an
individual's alleged sexual escapades which is profitable. Thepretenseof political
coverage may allow traditional mainstream news sources to cross over seamlessly
into the realm of tabloid news.' °5
4. Question No. 4
The fourth question, again borrowing directly from Meiklejohn's own words,
follows up on the issues just raised: Is broadcast journalism, as illustrated by
coverage of the Lewinsky matter, becoming a "dialectical free-for-all"' 6 in which
promotion of democratic self-governance is taking a backseat to the promotion "of
private, possessive interests,"0'7 namely, the financial well-being of the owners and
operators of media outlets?
The question is important for a number of reasons. First, it calls into question
the speech format offered on a growing number of frenetic news talk shows in
which journalists engage in what Meiklejohn might call dialectical free-for-alls.
During these news shows, journalists take part in what might be considered
"pointless prediction"'0 8about the outcome of the Lewinsky matter and argue over
how these speculative outcomes may affect society. To use Meiklejohn's phrase,
some of these shows may be thought of as the epitome of "unregulated
talkativeness"' 09 which the First Amendment should not protect. Perhaps, then, we
should question "why reporters spend so much time directing our attention toward
what is [no] ... more than guesswork on their part."'°
In the Lewinsky situation, for instance, the January 25, 1998 taping of ABC's
This Week with Sam and Cokie included veteran journalist Sam Donaldson

104. See Marjorie Connelly, PollsAre Split On Credibility of Key Figures,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18,
1998, at A 19. As of the writing of this paper, Clinton's job approval ratings continued to be very high
despite the allegations. See id. Three separate polls conducted on March 16, 1998 report that more
than sixty percent of respondents approved of the way Clinton was handling his job, even in the
aftermath of the 60 Minutes interview with Kathleen Willey. See id. This suggests that people make
distinctions and draw lines between the private lives and public performances of individuals. See id.
105. In the Lewinsky situation, "the reports of some mainstream outlets scarcely [were]
distinguishable from supermarket tabloids." See Witcover, supra note 93, at 19.
106. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 25.
107. See id. at 87.
108. See JAMES FALLOws, BREAKING THE NEWS: HOW THE MEDIA UNDERMINE AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 31 (1996). Calvin Trillin dubs the Sunday morning journalists "who are paid to
pontificate on television" news shows as "Sabbath Gasbags." See Calvin Trillin, Titanic (Glub),
Lewinsky (Blab), TIME, Mar. 23, 1998, at 36.
109. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM supra note 15, at 26.
110. See FALLOWS, supra note 108, at 32.
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predicting that President Clinton might have to resign from office within a week. "'
Such predictions amount to little more than a dialectical free-for-all and also, as
Meiklejohn might put it, allow speech to "wander from the [political] point at
issue. ,112The point, ultimately, is not what one celebrity journalist speculates, but
the ability of the public to vote wisely." 3
Moreover, Meiklejohn observed the importance of protecting "everything
worth saying."' Is the speech that occurs on dialectical free-for-all news talk
shows really worth saying? It is time to address this question in light of the speech
concerning the President's sex life. It appears that some members of the American
public, at least according to polls, apparently believe it is not worth saying." 5
Question No. 4 also forces consideration of whether a lust for income and
fame perpetuates this profitable dialectical free-for-all. As Calvin Trillin noted, in
reference to journalists who are paid to pontificate on television:
"

When the Sabbath Gasbags inform you what the American people want, what
they're really saying is what they-the Gasbags-want, and it usually coincides with
their own professional interests. It's the Gasbags who would love an opportunity
to chew over Bill Clinton's detailed explanation of his relationship with Monica
Lewinsky."16
As noted earlier, Meiklejohn called both for self-restraint in speech and for limited
protection of speech that serves only privateinterests,not the public interest.l1T He
wrote that "the First Amendment does not intend to guarantee [individual] freedom
to say what some privateinterest pays them to say for its own advantage."".8 This
language is clearly relevant to the dialectical free-for-all coverage of the Lewinsky
matter that is promoted by some journalists in order to engage in discussions for
the sake of their own ego gratification and profit. Meiklejohn also suggested that
speech should "cultiv[ate] those qualities of taste, of reasoned judgment, of
integrity, of loyalty, of mutual understanding upon which the enterprise of selfgovernment depends."' 9 Whether the fast paced format of broadcast journalism
(not to mention the fast changing pace of news on the Internet) and the talk shows

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

See This Week With Sam and Cokie (ABC television broadcast, Jan. 25, 1998).
See MEIKLEJOHN, POLrImCAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 24-25.
See id. at 26.
See id.
See supranote 104 and accompanying text.
Trillin, supra note 108, at 36.
See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 87.

that are a growing part of its ethos actually cultivate qualities of taste, reasoned
judgment, and integrity in political decision making is a ripe question for
discussion in light of the coverage of the Lewinsky incident.
Accuracy, unfortunately, also may be sacrificed in the dialectical free-for-all
and in the rush for profits. As mentioned above, Meiklejohn called for
"responsible" discussion. 2 ° In summary, the mannerof speech-notjust the quality
of the speech-is important for Meiklejohn. Question No. 4 calls attention to this
raft of issues.
5. Question No. 5
The fifth question at first appears to involve little more than an exercise in
verbal gymnastics and semantics. As discussed here, however, the word choice is
very important for evaluating press coverage of the Lewinsky matter. The fifth
question, once again borrowing from Meiklejohn's own writings, is: Does
repetitious coverage of the alleged Lewinsky affair "enlarge" debate about public
issues while, conversely, not serving to "enrich" that debate?'
This question addresses more than the issue of the manner in which
information is presented. Specifically, this question focuses on the quality of the
information disseminated to the public for consideration. It suggests a difference
between simply adding information to the discussion-enlarging speech-and
increasing the quality of that information-enriching speech.
For instance, in the days following the break of the Lewinsky story, new
information was disseminated by the press to the public-the metaphorical speech
market was enlarged-but that information was not always correct or of high
quality.
Meiklejohn's critical use of two distinct terms-enlarge and
enrich-highlights this difference and provides a framework for evaluating not only
the amount of reportage but the quality of it. In brief, the speech market may be
enlarged without being enriched. ,
Thus, repetitious coverage may not really enlarge the speech market, but
instead, may actually force out other important political speech that might in fact
facilitate democratic self-governance. Redundant coverage night after night in a
thirty minute or hour long newscast or news magazine show necessarily occupies
time that might be allocated to other stories. The initial blanket news coverage of
the Lewinsky incident no doubt crowded out other news stories during the week
it first arose or reduced them to small blips at the margins of the news radar

screen. 122

120. See id. at 25.
121. See id. at 19 (providing that Congress may legislate to "enlarge and enrich" speech).
122. During the week the scandal broke there were many newsworthy events, including the Pope's
historic visit to Cuba and Theodore Kaczynski's plea of guilty in the Unabomber case. Time magazine,
for instance, devoted a mere one-page story-a page that included two photographs-to Kaczynski's

[Vol. 26: 37, 1998]

Mutilation of the Thinking Process
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW

C. Overview
The five questions set forth above, all of which draw directly from
Meiklejohn's work and writings, tap into critical issues about the quality, quantity,
and manner of information conveyed and gathered by the press in the Lewinsky
matter. They cut to vital differences between speech that serves democratic selfgovernance and speech that does not serve the politic, between speech that
cultivates general intelligence and speech that mutilates the thinking process, and
between well-reasoned, orderly debates and dialectical free-for-alls. All of these
distinctions provide a context for analyzing press coverage of the Lewinsky
scandal. In brief, Meiklejohn's writings are as relevant today to the concepts of
free speech, free press, and democracy as they were a half-century ago when he
first published Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government.23
R I. ADDRESSING THE ISSUES
Meiklejohn's work, as Part II demonstrates, provides the foundation for
framing a multitude of issues and questions concerning the press coverage of the
alleged sexual relationship between Monica Lewinsky and President Clinton. This
Part of the Article does not pretend to resolve once and for all these issues or their
concomitant sub-issues. These issues, instead, require the kind of input, from all
affected by their resolution, that might occur at the type of town hall meeting that
Meildejohn cherished. Although one individual at the meeting cannot resolve the
issues in isolation, this Part nonetheless offers possible alternative positions on the
quintet of questions raised in Part II. To the extent that the alternatives offered
here are challenged by readers of this Article or that readers think of other
arguments on these issues, the better this Article has served its purpose in creating
a dialogue about important questions affecting the press and democracy.

A. QuestionNo. 1
This question tapped into the threshold issue of whether the President's sex
life constitutes political speech. 2 4 To the extent that any potential voters may be
influenced by this information-to the extent that it may influence or affect "the

guilty plea, while placing a picture of President Clinton and Lewinsky on its cover and allocating thirtythree pages to the Lewinsky story. See TIME, Feb. 2, 1998.
123. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 1.
124. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text.

voting of wise decisions"' 25-the subject itself would appear to be political speech
and deserve the utmost First Amendment protection.
That a minority of Americans may think that the scandal and the President's
sex life are not important and are better left without press coverage does not,
however, affect this answer. Why? Because the First Amendment must not
simply protect speech that the majority thinks appropriate and prohibit speech that
the majority finds inappropriate. Indeed, for Meiklejohn, speech cannot be
restricted merely because some find it offensive, unwise, or un-American. 126
Although some may find the President's sex life interesting for its own
prurient sake, independent of its impact on politics, others may find it important on
the question of the character of a public official. Character becomes the vehicle or
device for transferring information from the private realm to the public (and, in
particular, the political) sphere.'27 It transfers matters of mere interestto the public
into the realm of matters of public concern that affect the general welfare-speech
"upon matters of the public interest" 2 8 as Meiklejohn described it. Whether
everyone accepts the character argument is irrelevant because if any individuals
find it relevant for the voting of wise decisions, which is the telos of free speech
in a Meiklejohnian perspective, it becomes speech "upon matters of the public
interest. ' 129 As Meiklejohn wrote, "allfacts and interests relevant to the problem
shall be fully and fairly presented to the [town hall] meeting." 3 0 Meiklejohn, in
fact, specifically admonished that verbal attacks made to show the unfitness of a
candidate for government office should not be subjected to legislative control. 3'
The subject matter of the President's sex life thus may be viewed as political
speech. That the speech itself is political, however, does not resolve all issues, as
Meiklejohn's writings also focus on the manner in which the subject is discussed
and its effect on the thinking process and the general intelligence about politics.
Thus, it is now necessary to turn to the next question.
B. Question No. 2
The second question used Meiklejohn' s writings to make a distinction between
speech that mutilates the thinking process of the community with respect to politics

125. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 26.
126. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
127. Communications professor Louis A. Day makes a similar point with the press coverage of
former United States Senator Bob Packwood's sex life. According to Day, "[t]he private sex life of
Senator Bob Packwood ... would not normally be a matter of public interest. But when several women
accused Senator Packwood of sexual harassment-a charge that eventually led to an investigation by the
Senate Ethics Committee-the accusations became a matter of legitimate public concern." LouIs A.
DAY, ETHICS IN MEDIA COMMUNICATIONS: CASES AND CONTROVERSIES 120 (1997 2d ed.).
128. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 24.
129. See id.
130. See id. at 26 (emphasis added).
131. See Meiklejohn, supra note 25, at 259.
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32
and speech that, conversely, cultivates the general intelligence about politics.
Under one perspective, the massive coverage of the President's sex life reduces
politics to little more than the substance of an afternoon talk show like that hosted
by Jerry Springer or Ricki Lake. It denigrates the substantive issues that politicians
must deal with on a regular basis. The thinking process of the community about
politics, in turn, becomes little more than a thinking process about oral sex and
semen-sullied dresses. At a time when very few people bother to vote in
presidential elections, 33 such news coverage can only further harm the public's
perception about the lack of importance of participating in politics. People may
think more about the sex lives of politicians than their political position on
important issues that, as Meiklejohn put it, affect the general welfare.
Under an alternative perspective, the news media's discussion of the
President's sex life actually cultivates our general intelligence about politics. We
learn that politicians are not always individuals of high integrity, that they possess
the same foibles that many in the community have, and that they may make
mistakes in their personal lives. In other words, politicians can become, in a sense,
more "real" to the public. Our general intelligence about the nature of politics and
politicians is increased.
Likewise, if one answers the first question posed here in the affirmative-that
speech about the President's sex life is speech about politics-then this speech may
cultivate our general understanding about how politics works. We may learn that
politicians attempt to keep some information out of public view for fear that it may
hurt their political careers. We may learn information about them that affects our
voting decisions. We may learn that some politicians are hypocrites who preach
about one set of family values to the public while simultaneously adopting another
set of values for their own lives. Finally, we may gain some understanding of why
many people simply do not enter politics because they do not want all of the details
of their lives exposed in the morning newspaper, on the evening news, or on a site
on the World Wide Web.
As this section suggests, arguments can be made to show both that news media
coverage of the President's sex life cultivates and mutilates the thinking process
and the general intelligence of the community about politics and politicians.

132. See supra notes 83-94 and accompanying text.
133. According to a Voters News Service poll, a scant forty-nine percent of the voting-age population
cast a ballot in the 1996 presidential election which was less than half of all potential voters and the
lowest figure since 1924. See Eric Schmitt, The 1996 Elections: The Presidency-The Voters; Halfthe
Electorate,PerhapsSatisfiedor Bored,Sat Out Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 1996, at B6. The decrease
in voter turnout is especially troublesome because voter registration is probably at its highest level since
1968. See id.

C. Question No. 3
The third question asked whether journalists were moderators at a town hall
meeting who should reduce their own speech about the sex Scandal if34it becomes
''
repetitious and "wast[es] ... the time available for free discussion. 1
One perspective on this question is thatjoumalists are not moderators. Rather,
they are merely speakers. They do not need to reduce their own speech or organize
it in such an orderly fashion as Meiklejohn envisioned. There is a critical
difference between playing the role of information provider and the role of
discussionorganizer. 35 Contraryto Meiklejohn's view, in fact, journalists might
argue that it is more important that everyone shall speak and not that "everything
worth saying shall be said."036 The fact that the news media's speech about the sex
scandal may become redundant is not important if that speech is profitable when
it attracts large audiences of readers and viewers.
An alternative perspective is that journalists are moderators. They moderate
the flow of information to the public in their gatekeeping role. 37 In turn, television
news talk shows, call-in radio, and news websites are the modem-day equivalent
of. town meetings (even if the participants often are pundits or journalists
themselves). Journalists must exercise control, at the very least, because their
voices at the metaphorical town meeting are certainly the loudest and most
powerful due to their increased access to the means of mass communication for
transmitting and propagating their views. The sheer quantityof coverage about the
President's sex life, not the subject matter itself, may be reduced or moderated by
journalists to better serve democracy. As tied to Question No. 2, in turn, it may be
argued that it is the quantity of information about the President's sex life and not
the topic itself that actually mutilates, as opposed to cultivates, the thinking process
and general intelligence of the community about politics.
The third question, as explained in Part II, also raises an issue about the
threshold for when speech about the sex scandal may, in fact, become a waste of
available time for free discussion. One alternative here is to consider any amount
of coverage, no matter how redundant or massive, not a waste of time if people are
interested in reading or hearing it. In other words, if people want to read about it,

134. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
135. It should be noted that the so-called civic or public journalism movement calls for journalists
to do more than simply play the role of information provider. Proponent Davis Merritt believes "we are
nearing a state of paralysis caused by the gush of information," and therefore, journalists should go
"beyond merely telling the news." See DAVIS MERRITT, PUBLIC JOURNALISM AND PUBLIC LIFE 9 (2d
ed. 1998).
136. See MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 15, at 26.
137. See generally David Manning White, The "Gatekeeper": A Case Study in the Selection of
News, in SOCIAL MEANINGS OF NEWS 63 (Dan Berkowitz ed., 1997) (describing the gatekeeping
concept and its role in journalism).
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it is not a waste of time, even if a vast amount of coverage takes away time and/or
space that could be spent on other issues. This, of
course, plays on the distinction
138
between the wants and needs discussed earlier.
Another reason to protect all amounts of coverage is simply that determining
what is a "waste" is impossible. The term is vague and ambiguous. If it is true, as
the United States Supreme Court wrote in Cohen v. California,139 that "one man's
vulgarity is another's lyric,"'' 40 then it certainly is true that one person's waste of
time is another person's ideal use. Meiklejohn's phrasing thus makes bright-fine
drawing exceedingly difficult on this issue.
D. QuestionNo. 4
In analyzing this question, 141 one initially can easily :consider the early press
coverage of the Lewinsky affair a dialectical free-for-all rather than an orderly
discussion. Poorly sourced, 142 rushed stories that too often relied on the phrase "if
true,"' 43 as well as fast-paced news talk shows with so-called experts, contributed
to the dialectical free-for-all and unregulated talkativeness atmosphere that was
scorned by Meiklejohn.
Second, one can conclude that such a dialectical free-for-all is driven and
perpetuated in part by private possessory interests-namely, profits for corporations
and their shareholders-that Meiklejohn, it will be recalled, found were not
tantamount to the interests protected by the First Amendment.'44 Large audiences
were attracted to the coverage the news media offered, be it on television or on the
World Wide Web. Rather than hold off reporting until better information was
available and risk losing large amounts of revenue, economic interests dictated the
nature of reportage about the Lewinsky matter.
An alternative perspective, of course, is that the coverage itself actually was
solid and not a dialectical free-for-all. Indeed, it has been observed that "[m]any
news media outlets have acted with considerable responsibility, especially after the
first few frantic days, considering the initial public pressure for information, the
burden of obtaining much of it from sealed documents... and the stonewalling of

138. See supranotes 80-82 and accompanying text.
139. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
140. See id. at 25.
141. See supranotes 106-120 and accompanying text.
142. "Loose attribution of sources abounded" in the coverage of the Lewinsky scandal. See
Witcover, supra note 93, at 23.
143. See id. at 21.
144. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.

President Clinton and his White House aides." 145 In addition, one can argue that
the speech was serving more than just the private, pecuniary interest of the owners
of the news media, but was also serving the public interest by providing them
information that affected the general welfare and the voting of wise decisions.
E. Question No. 5
The final question-does repetitious coverage of the alleged Lewinsky affair
"enlarge" debate about public issues while, conversely, not serving to "enrich" that
debate?14 6-may be answered in several ways. First, it may be argued that the initial
coverage of the scandal itself was so repetitive and contributed so little new,
substantive information that it did not in fact enlarge debate about a public issue.
It merely cluttered or polluted the discussion in a kind of dialectical free-for-all
described in Question No. 4 that is contrary to the responsible, orderly type of
discussion that Meiklejohn believed was paramount for the effective discussion of
issues affecting democratic self-governance.
Alternatively, that coverage can be seen as enlarging the debate but not
enriching it because it was not always of high quality. Of course, one can also take
the view that the coverage both enlarged-by providing a greater quantity of
information-and enriched-by providing a high quality of information-discussion
of an important public issue about the President's character. As argued in Part II,
the difference between enlarge and enrich as used by Meiklejohn is more than a
matter of semantics; it suggests the difference between the quantity and the quality
of information.
IV. CONCLUSION
Fifty years separate the initial writings of Alexander Meiklejohn on the
relationship between free speech and democratic self-governance from the events
surrounding President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky. This Article, however, has
argued that Meiklejohn's writings are as important today for analyzing press
coverage of the Lewinsky matter as they were for understanding the free speech
censorship dangers a half century ago when faced with the fears of communism.
This Article has framed questions drawn from Meiklejohn's work to guide
discussion about news media coverage of the alleged Clinton-Lewinsky
relationship. Clearly there are approaches other than a Meiklejohnian one to
analyzing press coverage of President Clinton's sex life. Moreover, it is no doubt
possible to find lurking in Meiklejohn' s writings more than the quintet of questions

145.
146.

See Witcover, supra note 93, at 19.
See supra notes 74, 121-22 and accompanying text.
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raised in this Article.1 47 Finally, one is more than welcome to challenge the
perspectives and possibilities offered here for analyzing these issues. Those added
perspectives can only contribute to the type of town meeting discussion prized by
Meiklejohn.
The subject of the press coverage of the President's sex life undoubtedly will
be discussed in journalism ethics classes for years to come. The writings of
philosopher-educator Meiklejohn provide a substantive context that is recognized
in First Amendment jurisprudence for analyzing the complex issues nested in that
press coverage. Meiklejohn, ultimately, "could not see how democracy can exist
unless all people are able and willing to puzzle over it, question it, and deal with
its apparent dilemmas and contradictions." 148 His writings provide a context for
analyzing and puzzling over the dilemmas and contradictions posed by the press
coverage of the Lewinsky matter and its impact on self-governing democracy.

147. One wonders what questions Meiklejohn himself would have posed to the press and the public
about the media coverage of the Lewinsky incident.
148. See HARRIS, supra note 3, at 168.

